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PHOTOCOPYING AND COPYRIGHT LAW-
WILLIAMS & WILKINS CO. v. UNITED STATES
HOW UNFAIR CAN "FAIR USE" BE?
The mandate for copyright legislation in the United States
is found in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution which
granted Congress the power "[tlo promote the Progress of
Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors ... the exclusive Right to their respective Writing
.... "I This authorization allows Congress to pass legisla-
tion to protect authors and publishers from unauthorized copy-
ing of their original works. A copyright basically confers upon
its holder the exclusive right to multiply, publish, or sell copies
of the copyrighted original work.2 Indeed, for most purposes it
is tantamount to a monopoly on the right to reproduce that
work.3 It should be noted, however, that the "exclusive right"
Congress grants is not absolute; it is significantly limited by
the right or privilege of all persons to make "fair use" of the
copyrighted material.4
THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE: DELIMITING THE COPYRIGHT MONOPOLY
"[Slubsequent authors, publishers and the general public
may use a copyrighted work in a reasonable manner without
the consent of the copyright owner on the theory that such use
constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material." 5 Allowing
a variety of uses which would be prohibited if the copyright
were exclusive or absolute, the court-created fair use doctrine'
' U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8. It should be noted that the Constitution does not pre-
clude states from enacting laws on copyright and does not grant copyright authority
exclusively to the federal government. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 553,
rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 883 (1973).
2 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555, rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 883 (1973);
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 147 F. 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1906).
3 RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1940).
18 C.J.S. Copyright and Literary Property § 92 (1939).
Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); contra, Towle v. Ross,
32 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ore. 1940).
6 Yankwich, What is Fair Use, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 203, 214 (1954); Cf. Eisenschiml
v. Fawcett Publications Inc., 246 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1957); "The doctrine is entirely
equitable and is so flexible as virtually to defy definition!" Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis
Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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thus limits the scope of copyright holders' rights.7
Whether a particular use is a "fair use" is a question of
fact.' Generally, courts have accepted the premise that
fair use . . . depends upon the circumstances of the particu-
lar case, and the court[s] must look to the nature and ob-
jects of selections made, the quantity and value of material
used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale,
diminish the profits, or supersede the objects of the original
work.'
To determine whether a specific use is fair, courts ordinarily'
consider the following general criteria, stated by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia: "the value of the part
appropriatedf,] its relative value to each of the works in
controversy[,] the purpose it serves in each[,] [and] how far
the copied matter will tend to supersede the original or inter-
fere with its sale . . . ."' Given the variety of circumstances
which may rise, it is clear that a rigid test is undesirable, since
it cannot be effectively applied to all situations. Whether a
given use is a "fair use" or an actionable infringement is a
determination which must be made in light of the case law on
the subject and the circumstances under which the copying
occurred.
The use of ideas or information contained in a copyrighted
work without copying or imitating its words is allowed, since
ideas are not protected by copyright.' 2 On the other hand, since
"fair use" has been held to be based on a concept of reasonable-
ness, the general rule is that "extensive verbatim copying or
paraphrasing of material set down by another cannot satisfy
that standard.' 3 Therefore, it is usually an infringement to
copy the actual wording used in the copyrighted work.' 4 In
certain cases, however, the law seems to imply the consent of
I Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841); M. NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 145 (1973).
Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1943).
'Id. at 85.
20 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 145 (1973).
" Carr. v. National Capital Press, 71 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
22 18 AM. JuR. 2d Copyright and Literary Property § 36 (1965).
" Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir.
1966).
" Welles v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 308 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1962).
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copyright holders to some use of their writings. In a few cases
this implied consent is even held to extend to exact copying. 5
This is particularly true in the area of legal and medical publi-
cations:
. . . in which the entire community has an interest, and
which the authors are supposed to give forth, not only for
their own pecuniary profit, but for the advancement of sci-
ence. Therefore, as to copyrighted works of that character, by
the common consent to which we have referred, subsequent
authors are sometimes entitled, and indeed, required, to
make use of what precedes them in the precise form in which
last exhibited."
As is well known, the right to quote portions of a book in
a critique, commentary, or review is allowed. However, while
fair use allows quoting of portions of a copyrighted work, there
are limitations upon the extent of quotation:
Reviewers may make extracts sufficient to show the merits or
demerits of the work, but they cannot so exercise the privilege
as to supersede the original book. . . . [The privilege of
making extracts is limited .... 17
In West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co.,' the
Federal Court for the Eastern District of New York found no
actionable copyright infringement where one law book pub-
lisher used the compilations of cases made by the other pub-
lisher. There was no proven copying of syllabi or annotations.19
Noting that the flexibility of the fair use doctrine depended
upon the context in which the copying was done, the court
stated:
The words "unfair use", while having a broader meaning with
respect to the appropriation of earlier writings by a work
covering substantially the same ground, and supplanting the
earlier book, than they have in the acquirement of knowledge
upon the part of a student of the field treated by the publica-
tion, cannot, nevertheless, be arbitrarily made to be equiva-
"1 Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165,175 (S.D.
Cal. 1955), afi'd, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
"s Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 541 (1st Cir. 1905).
7 Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (No. 8136) (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
Is 169 F. 833 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1909).
19 Id.
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lent to no use at all, outside of consultation, in verifying the
ground covered and the subjects or cases comprised in the
earlier work. . . . [W]riters of books would be deprived of
the proper growth in knowledge, and from taking advantage
of the position to which the earlier writers had carried the
science under consideration."0
Similarly, in Baker v. Selden2 1 the Supreme Court has held
that the author of a copyrighted book on a bookkeeping system
had no right to prevent subsequent use of the illustrative dia-
grams contained in the book. The Court stated:
The very object of publishing a book on science or the useful
arts is to communicate to the world the useful knowledge
which it contains. But this object would be frustrated if the
knowledge could not be used without incurring the guilt of
piracy of the book. And where the art it teaches cannot be
used without employing the methods and diagrams used to
illustrate the book, or such as are similar to them, such meth-
ods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents
to the art, and given therewith to the public; not given for the
purpose of publication in other works explanatory of the art,
but for the purpose of practical application.
22
Of major importance is whether limited duplication of a
copyrighted work to be used by a limited number of persons is
a fair use or an actionable infringement.2 3 The prevailing Amer-
ican view on the subject follows the holding in an English case,
Ager v. Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co.24 There,
a navigation company made 150 copies of plaintiff's copy-
righted book of words for use in telegraphic transmission of
messages and distributed about one-third of the copies to its
agents. In the subsequent action for infringement the defen-
dant company argued fair use,2 reasoning that its use of the
book was non-commercial and that the distribution was lim-
ited. The court, however, was not persuaded:
[C]opyright is the right, by printing or otherwise, to multi-
" Id. at 866.
21 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
2 Id. at 103.
See generally 18 AM. JuR. 2D Copyright and Literary Property § 109 (1965).
21 26 Ch. D. 637 (1884).
2 Fair use is known in England as "fair dealing" and is statutorily recognized.
Copyright Act of 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, §§ 6, 7.
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ply copies . . . .It has long been settled that multiplying
copies for private distribution among a limited class of per-
sons is just as illegal as if it were done for the purpose of sale.
Take for example a valuable copyright like Lord Tennyson's
poems. No one can print them and distribute the copies
among his friends or among the boys at a school or any lim-
ited class of persons any more than he can print them for sale
26
Controversy over whether a use of copyrighted material consti-
tutes a fair use or an actionable infringement is not restricted
to books. In Towle v. Ross, 7 the Bonneville Administration
refused to purchase copies of the plaintiff's copyrighted map
showing electrical generating plants and transmission lines
throughout the Northwest United States. Later, twelve photo-
graphic copies of portions of the map were found in the Bonne-
ville Administration's drafting room. The only use proved by
the plaintiff was that twelve 8" by 10" photostatic copies were
made.28 There was no proof that the defendants used the cop-
ies; nevertheless, the defendants, employees of the federal
Bonneville Administration, 29 were held to be copyright infrin-
gers. The Oregon federal district court stated that "[t]here is
no fair or non-competing use of copyrighted material unless by
consent.""0
Likewise in MacMillan Co. v. King,31 an economics teacher
mimeographed a single page memorandum on material to be
covered in his class. The sheets contained
...[flrequent quotation of words, and occasional quota-
tions of sentences . . .[T]he attempt is made to reproduce
in abridged and paraphrased form (so far as such reproduc-
tion is possible within the narrow limits adopted) the author's
treatment of the topics selected .... 32
28 Ager v. Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co., 26 Ch. D. 637, 641 (1884).
2 32 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ore. 1940).
21 The making of reproductions was admitted. Towle v. Ross, 32 F. Supp. 125, 127
(D. Ore. 1940).
29 The Bonneville Administration was a federal hydroelectric project in the north-
west.
I Towle v. Ross, 32 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ore. 1940). The statement that there is no
fair use without consent is at odds with the overwhelming case law, which generally
holds that there is fair use. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487
F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
" 223 F. 862 (D. Mass. 1914).
32 Id. at 866.
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The teacher provided these to his students, who were required
to return them to the teacher; all sheets were subsequently
returned and destroyed. In finding copyright infringement and
a lack of fair use, the federal district court of Massachusetts
held that for purpose of the Copyright Act "printing" included
typewriting and mimeographing.3 3 The court also found that
there was "publication" even though the sheets were given to
such a limited group of persons and even though the students
had to return the copies. 4
Not only the quantum of the material reproduced, but also
the nature and purpose of the offending work may be determi-
native. Where a "pamphlet intended to advance the sale of
. . . Chesterfield cigarettes[,] . . . a purely commercial pur-
pose ' 35 used three sentences from a scientific treatise on throat
health and care, the use was held not to be for scholarly pur-
poses. Since the use was commerical in nature and not for the
advancement of education or science, the court refused to
imply the plaintiffs consent to such a use. The use was not fair
and therefore constituted an actionable infringement of the
plaintiff's copyright.
There are further limits to the application of the fair use
doctrine, limits which are necessary if the copyright laws are
to have any meaning. Copying from a copyrighted work cannot
be a fair use where so much is appropriated of the author's work
that the pecuniary value of the original is damaged.3 6 And there
is no fair use ". . . if so much is taken that the value of the
original is sensibly and materially diminished, or the labors of
the original author are substantially[,] to an injurious
extent[,] appropriated by another. . . .
LIBRARY PHOTOCOPYING-FAIR USE OR ACTIONABLE
INFRINGEMENT?
There has been much debate over library photocopying.38
Id. at 867.
s, Id.
Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D.
Pa. 1938).
3 L. AMDUR, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 13, at 775 (1936).
" Greene v. Bishop, 10 F. Cas. 1128, 1134 (No. 5,763) (C.C.D. Mass. 1858).
3' G. BUSH, TECHNOLOGY AND COPYRIGHT (1972); V. CLAPP, COPYRIGHT-A
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The photocopying and distribution of material by libraries has
been staunchly defended by library groups and researchers who
claim it is necessary for the advancement of science and knowl-
edge;3" such photocopying it is claimed, is therefore a fair use.
Authors and publishers, however, allege that the widespread
photocopying by libraries is an illegal copyright infringement
which imperils the publishers' very survival.1°
One authority4 has written that "[i]f there is one thing
which library photocopying is not, it is not fair use within any
judicial usage of that doctrine. 42 Generally, the fair use doc-
trine has been applied by the courts to "copying" where one
author uses another author's ideas and material in writing an-
other work, and has not been applied to a situation in which a
copyrighted work has simply been duplicated." Copying an-
other's ideas and work by incorporation into a new, original
work, it is said, is vastly different from the use of duplicating
machines in making "carbon copies" of the original copy-
righted work.
Photocopying is not merely an extension of manual copy-
ing, which was traditionally allowed under the doctrine of fair
use."1 Though the fair use doctrine is not functionally related
to time, the increased duplicating speed made available by
modern technology has transformed traditionally harmless
uses into possibly serious infringements. Whereas few persons
in the past would have the time to make copies of published
material, now almost everyone has access to sophisticated pho-
toduplicating machines which can copy pages of material in
seconds. Increased copying speed has resulted in increased
quantities of material copied." A use of copyrighted material
LmIUBiAAN's Vimw (1968); G. GInE, COPYRIGHT AND THE MACHINE, NEARER TO THE DUST
(1967); Needham, Tape Recording, Photocopying, and Fair Use, 10 ASCAP COPYRIGHT
LAW SYMPOSIUM 75 (1959).
" V. CLAPP, COPYRIGHT-A LIBRARIAN'S VIEW passim (1968).
4o G. GIPE, COPYRIGHT AND THE MACHINE, NEARER TO THE DUST passim (1967).
4 Pforzheimer, Historical Perspective on Copyright Law and Fair Use,
REPROGRAPHY AND COPYRIGHT LAw (1964).
42 Id. at 32.
13 Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 287 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1961).
, V. CLAPP, COPYRIGHT-A LRARIAN'S VIEW 18 (1968).
45 For a view of the effect on scientific and technological publishing of photocopy-
ing see Passano, How Photocopying Pollutes Sci-Tech Publishing, in TECHNOLOGY &
COPYRIGHT 266 (G. Bush ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Passano].
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that in the past was not a threat to copyright holders because
of the time factors, now threatens to destroy the copyright. As
Professor Needham, a noted copyright scholar, puts it: "'do-
it-yourself' home copyright infringement kits are available to
everyone.""
Clearly, present photoduplication practices are injurious
to the publishing business.47 Publishers fear that people who
can obtain photocopies free or for only a few cents per page will
not purchase the original from the publisher, and the fear is
well founded." It is often more economical for a reader to pay
for a photocopy of an article in which he is interested than it
is for him to purchase the journal from the publisher, and this
is particularly true in the area of scientific journals. If, for
example, a medical journal reader can receive free photocopies
of journal articles without purchasing the journal, it is not
likely that he will spend money to subscribe to such journals.
The sale of certain scientific journal subscriptiorfs has already
been affected by the availability of free photocopies.4
Williams & Wilkins Company v. United States: EXPANSION
OF THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE
Whether extensive library photocopying is a fair use or an
actionable infringement was at issue in Williams & Wilkins Co.
v. United States.50 Williams and Wilkins Company
Ihereinafter Williams & Wilkins], the plaintiff, was a major
" Needham, Tape Recording, Photocopying and Fair Use, 10 ASCAP COPYRIGHT
LAW SYMPOSIUM 75 (1959).
11 Petre, Statutory Copyright Protection for Books and Magazines Against Ma-
chine Copying, 14 ASCAP CoPYmiorr LAW SYMPOSIUM 180, 224 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Petrel; Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831 & H.R. 6835 Before
Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1517
(1965).
1 The English Copyright Statute expressly provides for library copying:
The copyright in an article contained in a periodical publication is not in-
fringed by the making or supplying of a copy of the article, if the copy is
made or supplied by or on the behalf of the librarian of a library of a class
prescribed by regulations made under this sub-section by the Board of
Trade, and the conditions prescribed by those regulations are complied with.
Copyright Act of 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2 c. 74, § 7 (1).
"9 Petre, supra note 47, at 224; Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831 &
H.R. 6835 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 1517 (1965).
- 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 2602 (1974) (No. 73-1279).
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publisher of medical journals and books.' It charged that the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, through the
National Institute of Health and the National Library of Medi-
cine, had infringed upon its copyright by. making unauthorized
photocopies of articles from four of the journals which it pub-
lished.52 Following an extensive trial, the trial commissioner
found the government liable for copyright infringement. 3 The
trial commissioner stated:
[Wlhatever may be the bounds of "fair use" as defined and
applied by the courts, defendant is clearly outside those
bounds. Defendant's photocopying is wholesale copying and
meets none of the criteria for "fair use." The photocopies are
exact duplicates of the original articles; are intended to be
substitutes for, and serve the same purpose as, the original
articles; and serve to diminish plaintiff's potential market for
the original articles since the photocopies are made at the
request of, and for the benefit of, the very persons who consti-
tute plaintiff's market. 4
The Court of Claims, however, in a four to three decision, re-
versed the findings of the trial commissioner and held that
there was no copyright infringement where the National Insti-
tute of Health and the National Library of Medicine supplied,
upon written request, photocopied reprints of articles from the
plaintiff's copyrighted medical journals.55
The Court of Claims based its decision on several factors,
not the least of which was its reading of Section 1 of the 1909
Copyright Act. According to the court's reading of the Act,
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1347 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
52 The National Library of Medicine and the National Institute of Health would
receive two copies of each journal. One copy would circulate among the staff members,
and one would remain in the library, available for general use. Physicians and re-
searchers would request an article they wished to read, and the library would thereu-
pon photocopy the article and mail it to them. The user would keep the copy.
0 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, No. 73-68 (Trial Commissioner, Ct.
Cl. 1972), reported in TECHNOLOGY AND COPYUGHT 375 (G. Bush ed. 1972).
I d.
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973). Whether
Williams & Wilkins Co. was the true owner of the copyrighted works allegedly infringed
was not decided by the court. The court assumed that Williams & Wilkins Co. was
the rightful copyright owner only for purposes of the case. A decision that they were
not the owners would obviously have made any decision on fair use dictum. Id. at 1349.
58 17 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1970) reads in pertinent part as follows: "Any person entitled
[Vol. 63
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there exists a "grave uncertainty" as to whether the act of
"copying" was intended to apply to periodicals.57 Apparently,
the court seemed to think that the "copying" which the Act
refers to is in the nature of making replicas of an object, not in
the nature of making duplicates of written material in periodi-
cals." The court was therefore unwilling to find that "copying"
of periodicals was statutorily proscribed. Trial Commissioner
James F. Davis took a different, more reasonable view. As he
saw it, the argument that "copying" did not apply to periodi-
cals was nonpersuasive and irrelevant:
It is clear from a study of all copyright statutes from 1790 to
date that what Congress has sought to do in every statute is
to proscribe unauthorized duplication of copyrighted works
.* ,*It is reasonable to infer that in 1909, when Congress
included "copying" in the list of proscribed acts applicable
to books and periodicals (as well as copyrightable subject
matter in general), it did so in light of the fact that new
techniques (e.g., photography) made it possible to duplicate
thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive right:
(a) to print, reprint, publish, copy and vend the copyrighted work ... " 17 U.S.C. §
5 (1971) reads as follows:
The application for registration shall specify to which of the following classes
the work in which copyright is claimed belongs:
(a) Books, including composite and cyclopedic works, directories, gazet-
teers, and other compilations.
(b) Periodicals, including newspapers.
(c) Lectures, sermons, addresses (prepared for oral delivery).
(d) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions.
(e) Musical compositions.
(f) Maps.
(g) Works of art; models or designs for works of art.
(h) Reproductions of a work of art.
(i) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character.
(j) Photographs.
(k) Prints and pictorial illustrations including prints or labels used for
articles of merchandise.
(1) Motion-picture photoplays.
(m) Motion pictures other than photoplays.
The above specifications shall not be held to limit the subject matter of copyright as
defined ig section 4 of this title, nor shall any error in classification invalidate or impair
the copyright protection secured under this title.
s' Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1350-52 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
58 Id. The reasons for the court's distinction are not clear and cannot be found in
the written opinion itself.
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books and periodicals by means other than "printing" and
"reprinting". 9
Traditionally, scholars had the privilege of making, by
hand, copies of material in libraries for their own use."0 The
Court of Claims, in Williams & Wilkins, extended this fair use
privilege to the "extensive" copying and distribution operation
conducted by defendant's libraries." In so doing, it rejected
arguments that if the hand copying privilege is to be extended
to photocopying, the amount of material which it is reasonable
to photocopy should be limited to that amount which a person
would have hand copied.62 Likewise it refused to recognize that
while "the potential for harm to the copyright holder is slight
when the culprit is a pen,. . . when the copier resorts to a high
speed photoduplicating machine the injury is imminent and
beyond repair." 3 In 1968, the National Library of Medicine
distributed about 93,000 articles, totaling approximately
930,000 million pages, which it had photocopied. 4 In that same
year, more than 1,000,000 pages of Williams & Wilkins's jour-
nals were photocopied and distributed by the 200 leading medi-
cal libraries in the United States.65 It is quite possible that
photocopying could replace the method of publishing using
type and printing presses which is now commonplace; indeed,
it has been suggested that over the next decade or two the
difference between conventional publishing and photocopying
will disappear. " Despite this obvious potential for copyright
infringement, the court held that the photocopying and distrib-
uting of the medical journals was more akin to hand copying
59 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, No. 73-68 (Trial Commissioner, Ct,
Cl. 1972) (emphasis in original), reported in TECHNOLOGY AND COPYRIGHT 375 (G. Bush
ed. 1972).
0 18 Am. JuR. 2d Copyright and Literary Property § 109 (1965).
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1366 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
'z Petre, supra note 47, at 180, 202.
63 Crossland, The Rise and Fall of Fair Use: The Protection of Literary Materials
Against Copyright Infringement By New and Developing Media, 20 S. CAR. L. REV.
.153, 188-89 (1968).
" Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1348 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
See also Passano, supra note 45 at 267.
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1348 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
"Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831 & H.R. 6835 Before Subcomm.
No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 1st Sess., at 121 (1965).
[Vol. 63
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that it was to traditional printing and was therefore not an
actionable infringement."
In refusing to find copyright infringement, the Court of
Claims also focused on the fact that the defendant photoco-
piers were non-profit organizations." This is a paradox. In
1960, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 149869 to make the federal
government liable for copyright infringement. 0 In 1960, Con-
gress no doubt knew the United States was a non-profit organi-
zation. It does not seem logical that Congress could have in-
tended that the federal government be immune from copyright
infringement because it is a non-profit organization and at the
same time pass legislation expressly stating that the federal
government was to be liable;7 yet this is exactly the result of
the Court of Claims' holding.
Even without this perplexing question, Williams & Wilk-
ins Co. v. United States is noteworthy for the emphasis it
places on the absence of profit-making in determining whether
there has been an actionable infringement. Neither the 1909
Copyright Act nor case law reguired that the copied work be
sold or that the infringer make a profit. 2 It has been held,
moreover, that mere printing or copying of a copyrighted work,
7 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1347 (Ct. CI. 1973).
Id. at 1354.
" 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1970) was originally enacted in one section and covered only
patent infringements. In 1960 Congress divided it into two subsections. § 1498(a) now
covers patent infringement by the federal government. § 1498(b) now covers a remedy
against the federal government for copyright infringement and provides:
whenever the copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws of
the United States shall be infringed by the United States, by a corporation
owned or controlled by the United States, or by a contractor, subcontractor,
or any person, firm, or corporation acting for the Government and with the
authorization or consent of the Government, the exclusive remedy of the
owner of such copyright shall be by action against the United States in the
Court of Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation
as damages for such infringement, including the minimum statutory dam-
ages as set forth in section 101(b) of Title 17, United States Code.
7, Formerly, copyright cases could not be brought against the federal government.
After 28 U.S.C. § 1498 was amended in 1960, a cause of action was granted against
the government for copyright infringement. This is the first copyright infringement
case brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1971) and therefore the first copyright case
to be heard by the Court of Claims. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d
1345, 1346 n.1 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (1970); but see, § 1361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 108 (1974).
17 U.S.C. (1971); 18 AM. JuR. 2d Copyright and Literary Property §§ 98, 104
(1965).
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without proof of sales thereof, will constitute infringement."
For example in Towle v. Ross 74 there was no proof that the
photocopiers of the map made a profit. Nor did the economics
teacher in MacMillan Co. v. King7" sell .the copies he made.
An additional factor examined by the Williams & Wilkins
court was the nature of the use the National Library of Medi-
cine made of the copyrighted material. In that regard, the court
found it significant that the copying was "within appropriate
confines". 6
Both libraries have declared and enforced reasonably strict
limitations which, to our mind, keep the duplication within
appropriate confines . . . .Both institutions normally re-
strict copying on an individual request to a single copy of a
single article of a journal issue, and to articles of less than 50
pages. . . .There is no showing whatever that the recipients
use the libraries' photocopying process to sell the copies or
distribute them broadly.7
That the court should partly base its decision on such
considerations as this is somewhat perplexing. If a commercial
publishing firm were to make copies of articles and distribute
them only on a one-per-customer basis, it is doubtful that the
court would find that the one-per-customer limitation estab-
lished fair use; yet the court implies that a one-per-customer
limitation is of great importance where the copier is a non-
profit governmental agency. To constitute a publication of a
work for infringement of copyright it is not necessary that cop-
ies be offered in the market for all to buy.78 There can be "pub-
lication" sufficient to constitute an infringement even where
the number of copies is limited and the users' rights to the
copies limited.79 The court's statement that the recipients of
the copies did not sell or further distribute the copies thus
creates a new wrinkle in copyright law, for Williams & Wilkins
was not charging the recipients of the copies with copyright
11 Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); see also MacMillan Co.
v. King, 223 F. 862 (D. Mass. 1914).
1 32 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ore. 1940). See text accompanying note 27 supra.
7' 223 F. 862, 866 (D. Mass. 1914). See text accompanying note 30 supra.
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
SId.
' MacMillan Co. v. King, 223 F. 862 (D. Mass. 1914).
I' !d.
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infringement; it was charging the copying and distributing in-
stitutions with copyright infringement. The assertion by the
National Library of Medicine that the recipients did not sell
the photocopies seems irrelevant. It is unclear how, or why, an
infringing publisher could use as its defense the fact that the
recipients did not further distribute the infringing copies."
Although Williams & Wilkins is the most recent case to
litigate library photocopying as an infringement of copyright,
such copying is not new and, indeed, has gone on since the turn
of the century in limited form.8' In the past, a "gentleman's
agreement", between a now-defunct organization of publishers
and a committee representing libraries and researchers, per-
mitted single photocopying of parts of books or periodicals. 2
These two facts-that library photocopying had been occurring
over a period of time and that there was an earlier "agreement"
allowing it-indicated to the court that library photocopying
was customary and reasonable. Indeed, as has been stated
before, what is fair use is a function of what is reasonable and
customary. 4 A use cannot be fair if it is not reasonable and a
customary use will tend to be reasonable.85 Though photocopy-
ing in various forms has existed for many years, the prior extent
" Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1354 (1973). According
to Leon Admur, the publisher, printer, binder, and vendor are all liable for copyright
infringement. L. AMDUR, COPYMRGHT AND LAW PRAcTIcE 941 (1939).
31 Early photocopying was slow, expensive, and not widespread. The amount of
library photocopying has increased enormously as a result of advances in xerographic
copying processes. Petre, supra note 45, at 201. That copying technology is advancing
rapidly, perhaps too rapidly for the law, is evidenced by the fact that Waterman
invented the fountain pen only 90 years ago, in 1884. 1974 WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF
FACTS 338 (1974).
82 The 1935 agreement was between a group of book publishers, the National
Association of Book Publishers, and the Joint Committee on Materials for Research.
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1355 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
" After discussing the fact that library photocopying has gone on for a long time
and the fact that there was earlier an agreement allowing it, the court then asks
whether the "increase in volume changes a use which was generally accepted as 'fair'
into one which has now become 'unfair'." Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,
487 F.2d 1345, 1356 (Ct. C1. 1973).
Petre, supra note 47, at 201.
However, though customariness presumes some reasonableness, what is merely
customary is not always legal. The nonexistence of unlawful customs has not been
proven.
A custom to copy is no defense to an action for copyright infringement. 18 C.J.S.
Copyright and Literary Property § 140 (1939).
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and nature of the copying are very dissimilar to its present
nature and extent. As previously noted, the threat to copyright
"has increased in proportion to the technical advances made
in reprography."5 This problem was well stated by former Sen-
ator Kenneth B. Keating, speaking on behalf of publishers be-
fore the House Committee on the Judiciary:
The new technology, the photocopying machinery, the infor-
mation storage and retrieval systems, which make rapid ac-
cess to material available to the user without requiring the
purchase of the books written by the authors and published
by the publishers, raise a very serious and essential question.
Should our copyright law provide that we feed the maws of
this machinery by conscripting to this wonderful new machi-
nery the services of authorship and book publishers without
remuneration to them . . . ?87
Unfortunately for authors and publishers, the answer to
Keating's question, in light of Williams & Wilkins, seems to be
a firm "yes." Though proof of actual damages is not required
before an infringement can be found8 and a "copyright owner
is entitled to recover for infringement of copyright even though
damages are trivial,"89 whether the plaintiff has been harmed
is a determining factor in whether defendant's use is fair or
unfair." According to the Court of Claims, the use the libraries
made of the journal articles did not harm the publisher, since
researchers would cease reading the articles if they had to buy
the journals. Thus the plaintiff, said the court, had failed to
sufficiently prove actual damages:
This record simply does not show a serious adverse impact,
either on plaintiff or on medical publishers generally, from
the photocopying practices of the type of NIH and NLM. In
the face of this record, we cannot mechanically assume such
" Comment, Copyright Law and Library Photocopying: Striking a Balance Be-
tween Profit Incentives and the Free Dissemination of Research Information, 48 IND.
L.J. 503, 508 (1973).
Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831 & H.R. 6835 Before Subcomm.
No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 63 (1965).
u Chappell & Co. v. Costa, 45 F. Supp. 554, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); MacMillan Co.
v. King, 223 F. 862 (D. Mass. 1914).
" Johns & Johns Printing Co. v. Paull-Pioneer Music Corp., 102 F.2d 282, 283 (8th
Cir. 1939).
10 Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943).
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an effect, or hold that the amount of photoduplication proved
here "must" lead to financial or economic harm. This is a
matter of proof and plaintiff has not transformed its hypo-
thetical assumption, by evidence, into a proven fact.9
Balancing the Need for Copyright Protection Against the Need
for Medical Knowledge
That medical science would be harmed if the photocopying
of medical journals was held to be an unfair use was ultimately
the decisive factor in Williams & Wilkins. According to the
court, if library photocopying were flatly proscribed, "medical
and scientific personnel would simply do without, and have to
do without, many of the articles they now desire, need, and use
in their work.""2 At this point one should note that Williams &
Wilkins was asking that the library pay a reasonable royalty for
photocopying the articles, not that they be enjoined from using
them altogether. 3 An injunction preventing the use of the arti-
cles altogether might well have been improper, since it would
place a severe burden on science; on the other hand, an order
that the library pay a royalty for such copying probably would
not have been unduly burdensome. Since Williams & Wilkins
was not asking for a flat proscription of library photocopying,
it is not readily apparent why the court emphasized the proba-
ble problems of a flat proscription. According to the court, if
the owner of the copyrighted material is willing to license pho-
tocopying at a reasonable rate, the 1909 Copyright Act dictates
that such royalty payments must be made.9 Photocopying
without payment of the royalty can never constitute "fair use",
the court noted, but if the owner adamantly refuses to license
the activity or seeks to charge excessive fees, photocopying
then constitutes fair use.9 A finding that library photocopying
was an actionable infringement in this case, where the plaintiff
had requested royalty payments, would have allowed the pub-
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1359 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
, Id. at 1357.
" Id. at 1371 (dissenting opinion).
" Id. at 1360.
,Id. The remedies available to Williams & Wilkins Co. are limited under 28
U.S.C. § 1498(b) (1970) to an "action against the United States in the Court of Claims
for the recovery of [the publisher's] reasonable and entire compensation as damages
for such infringement . .. ."
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lisher to demand reasonable royalties; if payment was not
made, he would have been justified in obtaining an injunction
prohibiting the photocopying. Any copying subsequently oc-
curring would then constitute an actionable copyright infringe-
ment. Balancing all the factors and circumstances discussed
above, the Court of Claims found that any harm which the
plaintiff publisher might suffer would be outweighed by the
probable harm to medical science if an infringement were
found. In face of the threat of impeding medical science and
in consideration of pending Congressional revision of the 1909
Copyright Act,"6 the court decided to allow the libraries to con-
tinue photocopying without liability for copyright infringe-
ment. 7 The court may well have underestimated the harm
which publishers of periodicals will suffer if such unfettered
photocopying is allowed to continue. Indeed, many scholars
and commentators have been rightly concerned with the harm
to medical science which results if scientists
... go to the nearest medical library, look over the tables of
contents of journals in their field and obtain from the library
photocopies of the articles which interest them. This is done
as a substitute for subscribing to the journals or obtaining
reprints from the authors of the articles. The economics of
science publishing are such that many journals cannot sur-
vive inroads of this kind into their subscription lists."
As a result of allowing scholarly journals to be freely photoco-
pied, the immedate "rewards" to medical science may well be
that journals will lose subscriptions and will be forced to dis-
continue publication.99 If these journals were forced by wide-
spread copyright infringement to cease publication, the scholar
would have no source from which to photocopy, and medical
science might well suffer a greater harm than it would suffer if
the libraries or copiers had to pay the publishers a royalty for
use of the journals.
" CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION (1973); U.S. Co-
PYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT OF THE REGISTRAR OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVIsION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (1961).
"7 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
" Passano, supra note 45, at 267.
' Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1385-89 (Ct. Cl. 1973);
G. GIPE, COPYRIGHT AND THE MACHINE, NEARER TO THE DUST (1967).
[Vol. 63
COMMENTS
THE INSUFFICIENCY OF ALTERNATIVE MODES OF PROTECTION FOR
PUBLISHERS
If the copyright law as it now exists, with fair use expanded
to encompass library photocopying, does not afford publishers
of medical journals protection from unauthorized copying,
what alternate means of protection are available? The printing
of journals with special dyes which are not copiable by present
day photocopy machines has been suggested.100 The
photocopiers in widespread use today do not copy certain colors
accurately. Machines which copy only into black and white
transform all colors into different shades of gray. Journals
printed with certain colors of ink on certain colors of paper,
would, when photocopied result in illegible copies.'0 ' Any at-
tempted use of colored inks and papers for protection could be
easily circumvented, however, by the use of copying machines
which could copy in color. It has also been suggested that stat-
utes should be enacted which would require all copying ma-
chines to be equipped with a special filter over the light
source.'0 2 A publisher's use of a special color ink, then, would
render illegible copies of his journal made on photocopy ma-
chines."0 Here again, however, would-be-copiers could easily
circumvent the system by removing the lenses.'04 Moreover, the
use of special dyes, inks, or filters is at present economically
unfeasible.'
Of course, one possible remedy for the problem of library
photocopying of journals would be contractual protection. Pub-
lishers of journals could contract with their subscribers that no
photocopies be made. Only those who would agree with the no-
copying provision would receive the journals. Of course, the
expense and difficulty of monitoring any unauthorized use of
the journals and of enforcing the contracts would be stagger-
ing.' 6 The creation of an ASCAP or BMI clearinghouse type
Igo Project, New Technology and the Law of Copyright: Reprography and
Computers, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 931, 959 (1968).
lgI Id.
I Id. at 959-60.
" Id.
10 Id.
' The expense to publishers of printing with colored paper or ink might be greater
than the loss of revenue they would suffer as a result of photocopying.
IN Liquidated damages provisions and arbitration clauses might possibly make
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system is another widely discussed means of protection.' The
clearinghouse would collect royalties from the users of copy-
righted journals and would then periodically forward the royal-
ties to the publishers.
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION
In 1909, when the present Copyright Act was passed, the
technology was not available for library photocopying as it ex-
ists today.' 8 Nor does the 1909 Act mention "fair use." Copy-
right law revision has been a subject of much congressional
action."9 In 1967, following an extensive debate between pub-
lishers (who feared any statutory language which might legi-
timize what they considered copyright infringements) and li-
brary groups and researchers (who feared any statutory lan-
guage which might restrict their current photocopying prac-
tices), the House of Representatives refused to codify "fair use"
and passed a copyright revision bill which did not contain any
provisions concerning copying."'
A similar copyright law revision bill'1 presently before the
contractual limitations on use of the journals more practical, but the use of contractual
limitations would be plagued by possible arguments that even contractual restrictions
on the use of the journals is unreasonable and against public policy. Also, the strength
of contractual protection might be weakened by arguments that the contracts are
contracts of adhesion.
"I ASCAP is the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers. BMI
is Broadcast Music, Inc. Both operate as clearinghouses, primarily for music.
Under one proposed clearinghouse system for journal publishers, the clearinghouse
would keep track of the frequency of use of the material by the individual users, charge
and collect the fees for that use, and periodically forward the fees it receives to the
publishers. The clearinghouse would be financed by a share of the fees collected. See
generally Petre, supra note 47, at 201; Sharp, Licensing the Photocopier, 1 SCHOLARLY
PUBLISHING 245 (1970).
,OS Petre, supra note 47, at 201.
, For a history of congressional activity in the field of copyright law revision, as
well as a comprehensive analysis of the pending bill to revise the copyright law, see
CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION-CoMPARATvE ANALYSIS
OF THE ISSUES (1973). For a brief synopsis of congressional revision efforts up to early
1968, see Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 396 n.17
(1968).
' H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SUPPLEMENTARY
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE UNITED STATES
COPYRIGHT LAW, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (Part 6 of the Copyright Law Revision 1965).
"' S. 1361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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Senate,12 however, contains provisions expressly dealing with
fair use'13 and with library photocopying of copyrighted materi-
als. " If enacted into law, Section 107 of the bill would denomi-
" S. 1361 was introduced as H.R. 8186 into the House of Representatives on May
29, 1973.
,,3 § 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair Use Notwithstanding
the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy-
right. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case
is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market or value of the
copyrighted work.
S. 1361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 107 (1974).
"I § 108. Limitations on exclusive rights: Reproduction by libraries and
archives
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringe-
ment of copyright for a library or archives, or any of its employees acting
within the scope of their employment, to reproduce no more than one copy
or phonorecord of a work, or distribute such copy or phonorecord, under the
conditions specified by this section, if:
(1) The reproduction or distribution is made without any
purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage; and
(2) The collections of the library or archives are (i) open to
the public, or (ii) available not only to researchers affiliated with
the library or archives or with the institution of which it is a part,
but also to other persons doing research in a specialized field; and
(3) The reproduction or distribution of the work includes a
notice of copyright.
(b) The rights of reproduction and distribution under this section
apply to a copy or phonorecord of an unpublished work duplicated in facsim-
ile form solely for purposes of preservation and security or for deposit for
research use in another library or archives of the type described by clause
(2) of subsection (a), if the copy or phonorecord reproduced is currently in
the collections of the library or archives.
(c) The right of reproduction under this section applies to a copy or
phonorecord of a published work duplicated in facsimile form solely for the
purpose of replacement of a copy or phonorecord that is damaged, deteriorat-
ing, lost, or stolen, if the library or archives has, after a reasonable effort,
determined that an unused replacement cannot be obtained at a fair price.
(d) The rights of reproduction and distribution under this section
apply to a copy, made from the collection of a library or archives where the
user makes his request or from that of another library or archives, of no more
than one article or other contribution to a copyrighted collection or periodical
1975]
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issue, or to a copy of phonorecord of a small part of any other copyrighted
work, if:
(1) The copy becomes the property of the user, and the li-
brary or archives has had no notice that the copy would be used
for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research;
and
(2) The library or archives displays prominently, at the place
where orders are accepted, and includes on its order form, a warn-
ing of copyright in accordance with requirements that the Register
of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation
(e) The rights of reproduction and distribution under this section
apply to the entire work, or to a substantial part of it, made from the collec-
tion of a library or archives where the user makes his request or from that of
another library or archives, if the library or archives has first determined,
on the basis of a reasonable investigatiof that a copy or phonorecord of the
copyrighted work cannot be obtained at a fair price, if:
(1) The copy becomes the property of the user; and the li-
brary or archives has had no notice that the copy would be used
for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research;
and
(2) The library or archives displays prominently, at the place
where orders are accepted, and includes on its order form, a warn-
ing of copyright in accordance with requirements that the Register
of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation.
(f) Nothing in this section-
(1) shall be construed to impose liability for copyright in-
fringement upon a library or archives or its employees for the unsu-
pervised use of reproducing equipment located on its premises,
provided that such equipment displays a notice that the making
of a copy may be subject to the copyright law;
(2) excuses a person who uses such reproducing equipment
or who requests a copy under subsection (d) from liability for copy-
right infringement for any such act, or for any later use of such
copy, if it exceeds fair use as provided by section 107;
(3) in any way affects the right of fair use as provided by
section 107, or any contractual obligations assumed at any time by
the library or archives when it obtained a copy or phonorecord of
a work in its collections.
(g) The rights of reproduction and distribution under this section ex-
tend t6 the isolated and unrelated reproduction or distribution of a single
copy or phonorecord of the same material on separate occasions, but do not
extend to cases where the library or archives, or its employee:
(1) is aware or has substantial reason to believe that it is
engaging in the related or concerted reproduction or distribution
of multiple copies or phonorecords of the same material, whether
made on one occasion or over a period of time, and whether in-
tended for aggregate use by one or more individuals or for separate
use by the individual members of a group; or
(2) engages in the systematic reproduction or distribution of
single or multiple copies or phonorecords of material described in
subsection (d).
(h) The rights of reproduction and distribution under this section do
o
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nate any use as fair when utilized for purposes of "criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or re-
search."' 15 The court-created doctrine of fair use would become
statutory law. Section 108, if enacted, would restrict library
photocopying to
no more than one article or other contribution to a copy-
righted collection or periodical issue, or to a copy or phonore-
cord of a small, part of any other copyrighted work if: (1)
[t]he copy becomes the property of the user, and the library
or archives has had no notice that the copy would be used for
any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or re-
search and a copyright warning is given."16
This section would thus codify, in part, the holding of Williams
& Wilkins Co. v. United States."7 The Senate bill would also
allow a photocopy of an entire work to be made from the collec-
tion of a library if the library has first determined that a copy
could not be obtained at a fair price." 8 Here, too, there would
be a requirement that the copy becomes the property of the
user and that the library has no notice that the user would use
the copy for any purpose other than private study, scholarship,
or research." 9
If passed, a copyright revision bill containing the provision
on fair use and library photocopying outlined above would af-
firm the holding in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States.
The result might be the abolition of copyright on medical jour-
nals and the eventual demise of the journals.
CONCLUSION
Publishers of medical journals must be granted copyright
protection against library photocopying; abolition of that pro-
tection may seriously damage their economic ability to con-
not apply to a musical work, a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work, or a
motion picture or other audio-visual work, except that no such limitation
shall apply with respect to rights granted by subsections (b) and (c).
S. 1361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 108 (1974).
.5 S 1361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 107 (1974).
"' Id. at § 108(d).
"' 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
" S. 1361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 108(e) (1974).
Id.
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tinue producing such journals. Books and periodicals are pro-
duced for financial return, and few titles would be printed if
the publishers were unable to recover their expenses and make
a profit. Stanley Kauffman, writing in the New Republic, aptly
summarized the situation:
The zoom in school population and in technical development
has produced a fine flow of public spirit in those who have
nothing at stake. As soon as we read of any electronics firm
supplying free computers to the government or free television
equipment to school and educational networks, then we can
all agree that authors are bad citizens in asking to be paid
for the educational use of their work.120
It is neither burdensome nor oppressive for libraries to comply
with the copyright law and get permission to photocopy, 2' and
it would not seem burdensome for them to pass a reasonable
royalty on to the publishers and authors of articles which they
reproduce. The practical means exist to charge each user di-
rectly and equitably for copying protected works.12 The major-
ity opinion in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States'2 states
that its holding is based on the narrow issue of fair use photo-
copying of journals by the National Library of Medicine and
National Institute of Health for purposes of medical research.124
However, dissenting Judge Nichols warned that the holding of
the case will be read to mean that libraries are not bound to
respect copyrights. 25 As he so aptly phrased it: "We are making
the Dred Scott decision of copyright law."'' 2
Larry F. Sword*
,20 Fair Use, NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 7, 1967, at 40.
121 Thomas, Note on Photocopying and Copyright, 40 CATHOUC LmARY WORLD
583 (1969).
22 Sharp, Licensing the Photocopier, 1 SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING 245 (1970).
'2 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
12 Id. at 1362.
' Id. at 1387 (dissenting opinion).
126 Id.
* This paper is entered in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition, sponsored
by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
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